Limping Toward Justice

An international accompanier's account of her time in a Colombian community engaged in non-violent resistance to the decades old armed conflict.

"Justice...limps along, but it gets there all the same." -Colombian Nobel Prize winning author, Gabriel García Márquez

Saturday, October 28, 2006

A brief historical perspective on the Colombian armed conflict

The origins of the current armed conflict in Colombia are incredibly complex and rooted in the period known as "La Violencia". In 1948, the assassination of popular Liberal Party Presidential candidate , Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, inflamed ongoing tensions between the Liberal and Conservative ruling parties resulting in close to 200,000 deaths and the internal displacement of about 2 million Colombians.

In 1957, the ruling parties reached a power-sharing agreement known as the "National Front" in which all other political views were pushed to the margins. This set the stage for the formation of various insurgent groups in the '60s and '70s. Guerrilla groups such as the ELN, FARC and M-19 formed while the Colombian government alternated between Liberal and Conservative administrations every four years. "La Violencia" ended in 1964 and the modern war began.

The Colombian military grew during this period, receiving training and financial backing from the United States. In the '60s, the army began training civilians as part of the autodefensas (also known as paramilitaries), formed to further combat the insurgency. This escalating violence continued through the end of the National Front in 1970 as insurgent groups continued to battle the government and use kidnappings and extortion to fund their guerrilla operations. In 1980 the first modern day paramilitary group formed, "MAS", its Colombian acronym standing for "Death to Kidnappers" and its formations a response to the kidnapping of the family members of Colombian drug traffickers.

In 1984 the largest guerrilla group, FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the M-19 guerrilla group agreed to a cease-fire with the government. In 1985 the Unión Patriotica (Patriotic Union) emerged as a democratic alternative to the two main Colombian political parties and focused on realizing solutions to the problems of the poor and marginalized. While the FARC did play a main role in the founding of the party many Colombians f
rom the left and independent social sectors were active as supporters and candidates. The UP enjoyed very small successes in the national government as members were subjected to kidnappings and killings by paramilitary groups.

By 1998 the UP reported that more than 500 of its leaders had been killed. That same year a report by Amnesty International charged that members of the Colombian military and government were involved in carrying out what was called a "deliberate policy of political murder". This period also saw violence directed towards mainstream political leaders and candidates leading to an overall total of between 3000 and 5000 politically related deaths during the mid-eighties.The late 80s also saw some of the smaller guerrilla groups incorporated into the peace pro
cess, including the M-19 guerrilla group. Conversely, the FARC's ceasefire ended, following breakdown in negotiations in 1987 and the government's unwillingness to continue contact with the rebel leaders. The ceasefire years actually proved to be a time of rebuilding for the FARC who added 14 fronts, more than doubling in size, between 1984 and 1988.

In 1987, the charasmatic UP presidential candidate, Jaime Pardo Leal, who had garned over 300,000 votes in the '86 national election was assasinated. In 1990 the UP's presidential candidate, Bernardo Jamarillo, was murdered and while the party continued to contribute candidates through 1994, it had effectively disintegrated. Braulio Hererra, a very popular UP leader who was elected as a Congressional Stand-In in the 1986 elections said during his time in Congress, "What's characterized this conflict is that no one has been able to defeat anyone."


The 1993 assassination of infamous Medellín drug cartel leader, Pablo Escobar resulted in the break up of the larger drug cartels into smaller narcotrafficking groups as well as a renewed paramilitarism. In 1994 Carlos Castano assumed leadership of a centralized paramilitary and formed the AUC, or the United Self-Defense Forces of Colo
mbia. As combat continued, mostly in the Colombian countryside as the FARC and ELN fought both the military and AUC forces, civilians caught in the midst of the armed conflict continued to suffer. Colombian civilians were killed, massacred and displaced from their homes and forced to relocate to the poor shanty towns of the major cities.

Colombian President Andres Pastrana was elected in 1998 under a commitment to bring about a peaceful resolution to the decades' old conflict. He quickly began peace talks with the FARC and ELN. These met with many complications and eventually fell apart. Pastrana sought help for the civilians harmed in the conflict from W
ashington DC. However, what was intended as a development package akin to the Marshall Plan for the areas of the country and civilians most affected by the conflict materialized in 2000 under the Clinton administration as "Plan Colombia". This formalized aid package to Colombia authorized 1.3 billion dollars, 70% of which would be directed to military and security measures designed to combat the "drug war". This was a far cry from the original social aid package that addressed the human rights needs of a civilian population long suffering from the deadly conflict.

The election of President Alvaro Uribe, whose own father was killed by guerrillas, in 2002 signaled a shift away from peace negotiations and back to increased militarism. The rhetoric of the armed conflict also shifted after the events of September 11, 200.1 The remaining guerrilla groups (FARC and ELN) are now referred to as terrorists as the Bush administration continues to provide funding under Plan Colombia, now earmarked as funding in the war against global terror. The Uribe administration began the demobilization process of paramilitary forces and the intensification of military efforts aimed at wiping out guerrilla forces in the countryside. This process has met with objections as the impunity of the demobilization process is hard to ignore.

Today in Colombia there are between 2 and 3 million internally displaced people,
according to the UN and 49% of the population lives in extreme poverty. The armed conflict continues to displace people from the countryside and paramilitarism continues to play out in the cities. The US continues to fund "counter-terrorism" efforts through Plan Colombia (renamed the Andean Counterdrug Initiative) scheduled to deliver over $734 million in 2006, 81% of which is earmarked for military assistance.

-this info was compiled from various speakers and meetings I've been lucky to attend, books I am glad to have read (including the incredibly concise " Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization" by Mario Murillo) and some recent stats from the very helpful www.ciponline.org




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